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Summary 
What are the effects of providing civic leadership training to community leaders 
from marginalised groups? Can it lead to increased participation by new leaders 
in local government processes, and increased government responsiveness to 
the needs of the poorest and most marginalised? Does it have the unintended 
consequence of these new leaders being co-opted by local politicians?
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Governance Lab (MIT GOV/LAB), in 
partnership with a coalition of local civil society organisations led by Concerned 
Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG), explored these questions in the 
Northern Luzon region of the Philippines. We investigated the impact of civic 
leadership training on citizen participation and government responsiveness 
through an experimental pilot intervention, which was implemented in eight 
municipalities, randomly selected from a total of 16 municipalities included in the 
study. The remaining eight acted as control municipalities.
The intervention targeted ‘parent leaders’ – individuals already identified as 
community leaders in a large-scale government conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programme that aims to benefit the ‘poorest of the poor’ in the Philippines. 
Parent leaders, who are themselves beneficiaries of the CCT programme, are 
selected by fellow beneficiaries to act as liaisons between beneficiaries and 
the CCT implementing agency in each community. Many parent leaders have 
previous leadership experience and higher levels of education relative to other 
beneficiaries; however, as beneficiaries themselves, they still have relatively low 
socio-economic status. 
CCAGG and its partners designed a training intervention to build the capacity 
of parent leaders as ‘community facilitators for change’ who can represent the 
interests of the poor, not just in the context of the CCT programme, but in local 
governance more broadly. In doing so, the partners sought to use the programme 
as a vehicle for political empowerment, as well as economic empowerment. 
Our research collaboration evaluated the impact of this model on the political 
participation of parent leaders, and the responsiveness of local government 
officials to the needs of marginalised groups. In addition, we assessed the 
potential for unintended political consequences of the leadership training 
in the Philippines, where strong clientelist networks can influence electoral 
mobilisation. In particular, we considered the possibility that leadership capacity-
building might make parent leaders more attractive to politicians as ‘vote brokers’ 
– individuals who can deliver the votes of their fellow beneficiaries in exchange for 
personal gain. 
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The findings from this research collaboration will contribute to our understanding 
of leadership capacity-building interventions in similar contexts, and help inform 
decisions about the scaling up of this particular model throughout the Philippines 
(this is currently being considered). The research yielded several initial, high-level 
lessons.
Civic leadership training for parent leaders increased their political 
participation and engagement. We tested the impact of civic leadership training 
on 12 outcomes that measure political engagement. For 11 out of the 12 outcome 
measures, the treatment and control groups showed a difference in the expected 
direction. Compared to parent leaders who did not receive the training, newly 
trained parent leaders’ greater engagement was evident in several ways, for 
example higher attendance rates at local town hall meetings and participating 
more directly with local officials (e.g. asking questions and providing comments). 
Parent leaders who received training also demonstrated greater knowledge of 
government regulations and citizens’ rights.
While most of these differences were not significant in a statistical sense 
(unsurprising given the small number of municipalities in the study), many of 
them were large, and the consistent pattern across so many outcomes provides 
suggestive evidence that the training increased political engagement among 
parent leaders.
There were changes in government responsiveness. While there was little 
difference in citizens’ perceptions of government responsiveness to their 
complaints and concerns, local government officials in the communities 
where parent leaders were trained complied at higher rates with government 
transparency regulations (e.g. posting budgets in public places, reporting on 
budgetary revenues and expenditures during town hall meetings). Trained parent 
leaders also reported interacting with local officials outside of town hall meetings 
more frequently than untrained parent leaders. These differences, while not 
statistically significant, suggest that the impact of the training intervention may 
have gone beyond parent leaders, and extended to behavioural changes among 
local government officials. 
There was no evidence of parent leaders being co-opted. In fact, reported 
rates of co-option, measured with a series of questions about election-related 
engagement and personal assistance received from officials, were lower on 
average in the municipalities where parent leaders had been trained. However, 
the postponement of local elections (originally scheduled to take place during the 
study period) made this hypothesis difficult to assess.
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1. Introduction
1 This study was filed with the Evidence in Government and Politics registry prior to the completion of endline data collection (ID: 
20170807AA).
2 This model, while considered effective by many at insulating the programme from political ‘capture’, has proven controversial in 
recent years. See, for example, GMA News Online (2016). 
3 See: https://ptfund.org/project/i-pantawid 
1.1 Conditional cash transfers in 
the Philippines
This research examined the effect of a civic leadership 
training programme provided to beneficiaries of the 
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the 
Philippines.1 This large-scale government conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) programme currently serves over 
4.4 million households, making it the fourth largest 
CCT programme in the world, based on population 
coverage (World Bank 2017). It aims to reduce 
poverty by providing cash directly to beneficiaries who 
comply with social welfare programmes focused on 
child health, nutrition and education.
Specifically, the programme provides families with 
cash grants on the condition that parents attend 
regular training sessions on responsible parenting, 
keep their children in school, and ensure that children 
and pregnant women in the household seek certain 
basic health services regularly. The programme 
targets poor families with school-aged children, 
and beneficiaries are selected by the programme’s 
implementing agency, the Department of Social 
Welfare and Development, through a national 
household poverty-targeting system. Locally elected 
officials are deliberately excluded from the selection 
process to prevent abuse of the programme for 
political gain (Hayakawa, van de Brink and Posarac 
2015).2 
The 4Ps has successfully achieved many of its goals, 
particularly in terms of increasing school attendance 
and the use of health services by poor people (World 
Bank 2013). The civic leadership training intervention 
that is the focus of this research, known as Project 
i-Pantawid, built on the existing infrastructure of the 
4Ps. It was intended to sustain the gains made and 
ensure that the increased uptake of public services 
translated into longer-term improvements in well-
being for beneficiary families. 
1.2 Project i-Pantawid 
In this study, we evaluated a pilot project called 
‘Guarding the Integrity of the Conditional Cash 
Transfer Program for the Philippines’, also known as 
Project i-Pantawid.3 This project was implemented 
in three different batches, each targeting a different 
group of municipalities. Each intervention involves 
a set of training modules, one per month; it takes 
approximately one year to complete the full set of 
modules. This research was focused on the project’s 
third batch. 
The project is implemented by members of the 
Northern Luzon Coalition for Good Governance, a 
consortium of civil society organisations (CSOs) 
based throughout the northern Philippines, and led by 
Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government, a 
CSO based in Bangued, Abra Province. It is supported 
by the World Bank Global Partnership for Social 
Accountability.
Project i-Pantawid focuses on civic education, civic 
skills and leadership training. It aims to empower 4Ps 
beneficiaries to:
• help monitor the implementation of the 4Ps 
• hold elected officials and service providers 
accountable for improving the quality of local 
services 
• increase beneficiaries’ participation in local 
governance more broadly.
The project builds on two programmatic innovations 
unique to the 4Ps, which are applied throughout the 
Philippines: family development sessions and parent 
leaders. Family development sessions are monthly 
lectures that CCT beneficiaries must attend as one of 
the conditions for receiving cash grants. They focus on 
topics such as responsible parenting, substance abuse, 
and health and nutrition, and are usually delivered by 
the staff of local government agencies, religious leaders 
or local CSOs. 
Parent leaders are chosen by fellow CCT beneficiaries, 
and act as liaisons between beneficiaries and the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development. Their 
typical duties include organising fellow beneficiaries 
for meetings, helping track beneficiaries’ compliance 
with the conditionalities of the programme, assisting 
beneficiaries with paperwork, and communicating 
information from the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development to beneficiaries. They serve at the level 
of the barangay, or village, the lowest administrative 
unit in the Philippines. On average, there are two to 
three parent leaders in each barangay, depending on 
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the number of CCT beneficiaries.4 Each beneficiary is 
assigned to a specific parent leader’s group. 
Project i-Pantawid aims to build the capacity of parent 
leaders and expand their role further, so that they 
can act as civic leaders, or ‘facilitators of change’, 
and represent the interests of the ‘poorest of the 
poor’ in their communities. The project’s training 
interventions aim to develop parent leaders’ civic skills 
and leadership capacity. Once a month, parent leaders 
gather for a training workshop focusing on the content 
for the family development session to be held later that 
month, so that they can lead this session themselves 
(usually these are led by a government official, local 
non-governmental organisation representative or 
church leader). 
The training workshop, run by a CSO facilitator and 
usually held at a municipal hall or other public space, 
focuses on parent leaders’ civic skills and civic values, 
and teaches them how to teach the material to other 
CCT beneficiaries. Through this process, parent leaders 
learn and practise skills such as public speaking and 
how to mobilise CCT beneficiaries.5 Project i-Pantawid 
also modifies the content of family development 
sessions to focus more explicitly on civic education, 
including modules on the duties of local officials, 
the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and local 
government budgeting.
In addition to these monthly training events, Project 
i-Pantawid organises ‘interface’ meetings between 
parent leaders, 4Ps beneficiaries, and health and 
education service providers. Parent leaders then 
mobilise and organise CCT beneficiaries to work with 
these service providers to evaluate the quality of 
service provision, discuss their respective scores and 
develop joint action plans to address any shortfalls 
identified. Parent leaders also take a leadership role 
during meetings in which CCT beneficiaries form a 
social contract with the mayor of each municipality. 
This contract outlines the responsibilities of both 
beneficiaries and the mayor, both to the 4Ps and to 
their communities.
The expansion of parent leaders’ role – to include 
broader engagement with authorities, and to represent 
citizens’ interests – raises the potential for both positive 
impacts and unintended, negative impacts. For example, 
the training aimed to build the capacity of parent leaders 
to organise their marginalised communities around 
shared goals and navigate existing channels of power. 
This could lead to improved social accountability in 
local governance and increased representation of these 
4 In our sample, the highest number of parent leaders in a barangay was six, and the lowest was zero (in this case, one parent leader 
served two adjoining barangays). 
5 The training workshops are held at the municipal level. Administratively, the Philippines is divided into 81 provinces, which in 
turn are divided into cities / municipalities. Each of these is governed by a mayor and vice-mayor, along with a legislative 
municipal council.
6 Randomised evaluation is a conventional term in development studies – see Poverty Action Lab (nd). 
groups’ interests. On the other hand, it could make these 
leaders more attractive to political elites as ‘brokers’ – 
people who can deliver votes at election time. 
Recognising this possibility, Project i-Pantawid includes 
a ‘values formation’ component. This aims to socialise 
parent leaders and ‘inoculate’ them against clientelistic 
politics, through the teaching and discussion of 
civic values over a sustained period. However, the 
efficacy of this type of training may be limited in the 
face of economic incentives from politicians, and the 
entrenched system of vote-buying and patronage in the 
Philippines.
1.3 Rationale for this research
Capacity-building workshops and training events 
abound in developing countries. Many of these 
focus on what Watkins, Swidler and Hannan (2012: 
299) call “the technology of talk”, in which CSOs 
“talk to members of their community about the 
importance of participation and empowerment for 
their future prosperity”. These interventions are often 
conceptualised as educational initiatives that inform 
citizens about their rights and entitlements (Reinikka 
and Svensson 2011; Björkman and Svensson 2009), 
the performance of their government officials (Molina 
2014) and, increasingly, the options available to them 
for voicing their dissatisfaction (Pandey, Goyal and 
Sundararaman 2009).
But as randomised evaluations6 of these interventions 
accumulate, the evidence of impact is mixed at best 
(Lipovsek and Tsai, forthcoming; Khemani 2016). There 
is a growing consensus that information provision by 
itself rarely works (Kosack and Fung 2014; Lieberman, 
Posner and Tsai 2014). What else is needed? One 
answer is that citizens lack not only information about 
why and how they should participate, but also the skills 
needed for participation, and opportunities to put those 
skills into practice. 
Scholars and practitioners have long recognised the 
need for civic skills. Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s 
(1995) dominant resource-mobilisation model of 
political participation in the United States suggests 
that, independent of income and access to education, 
one of the ways in which under-resourced populations 
can overcome inequalities in participation is by 
acquiring civic skills, through activities organised by 
churches and other community groups. They found that 
the opportunities that such groups provide to exercise 
civic skills were less socially stratified than in other 
contexts. 
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Social movement theory also highlights the importance 
of tools and actions, or ‘repertoires of contention’, 
that are shared through group-based mobilisation 
and grass-roots activism (Tilly 2002; Tarrow 1998). 
Studies of civil society and social capital have found 
that the skills and templates provided by associational 
life and dialogue are critical for inter-group cooperation 
(Varshney 2003; Putnam 1993) and the development 
of a public sphere in which society guides the state 
effectively (Habermas 1989).
Consistent with these theories, several of the 
interventions that have demonstrated an impact on 
participation included concrete opportunities for 
practising participation skills. In the intervention 
evaluated by Björkman and Svensson (2009), for 
example, citizens had repeated opportunities to 
practise speaking up in ‘interface meetings’ with 
local health workers that were facilitated by local 
non-governmental organisations. In Olken’s study in 
Indonesia (2007), non-elite villagers were extended 
formal invitations to public accountability meetings 
with government officials to encourage community-
level monitoring of local development projects. In 
Pandey et al.’s study of an information campaign on 
public school performance in India (2009), eight 
to nine public meetings were held in each village, 
providing parents with opportunities to question 
and engage in discussion with members of school 
oversight committees. Raffler’s intervention (2016) 
consisted of a training workshop for councillors and 
local bureaucrats, providing them a platform to clarify 
the division of roles between them and reinforce the 
councillors’ monitoring mandate.
Targeting individuals who have already been identified 
as potential leaders among marginalised groups can 
boost the efficacy of civic education interventions. 
Previous theoretical literature also suggests that 
focusing explicitly on building leadership capacity 
within communities – in particular, by enabling 
community leaders to improve their mobilising, 
organisational and public-speaking skills – is 
necessary for increasing citizen engagement. Leaders 
can overcome obstacles to collective action (Olson 
2009; Ostrom 1990) in situations when one person’s 
complaint or action is unlikely to make a difference.
Studies of developing contexts suggest that the 
civic skills needed for interaction with government 
authorities are often a crucial gap for participation 
and engagement by ordinary citizens. People often 
find the state to be ‘opaque’ (Webb 2012; Ghertner 
2011; Chatterjee 2004; Fuller and Benei 2000), and 
lack an understanding of government decision-making 
processes and how to engage with government 
authorities (Lieberman et al. 2014; Carter 2013; 
Folscher 2010). The extensive body of research on 
‘brokers’ in these contexts notes that some of the 
main resources they have to offer are their practice, 
personal experience and skills in ‘navigating the 
system’ (Krishna 2011, 2002; Boone 2003; Manor 
2000; Jennings 1997; Duara 1991). When citizens need 
to make claims, or engage with the state, they seek the 
help of these intermediaries – and are often willing to 
pay them, in cash or with political support, in exchange 
for the benefit of their skills (Webb 2012; Corbridge 
and Kumar 2002; Ruud 2000).
Existing literature and practice thus suggests that we 
need to go beyond civic education, and build leadership 
capacity by providing new opportunities for community 
leaders to put the skills they learn through workshops 
into practice. Yet there are a number of reasons why 
this approach may still be insufficient for increasing 
citizen engagement among marginalised groups. 
First, this approach may not equip participants with 
sufficient ability and / or confidence to take action. 
Structural inequalities and discrimination undermine 
people’s sense of worth and confidence, and political 
participation is less likely among people with fewer 
resources (Han 2009). 
Second, the extensive literature on clientelism predicts 
that poor and marginalised individuals are the easiest 
for politicians to co-opt and buy off (Stokes, Dunning, 
Nazareno and Brusco 2013). Given the material 
benefits at stake for complying with politicians, even 
increased civic education and leadership capacity 
may not be enough to lead people to question local 
authorities or effectively sanction poor performers 
at the ballot box. This literature also suggests that 
individuals with large social networks and civic skills 
are more likely to be recruited as vote brokers (Cruz 
2013; Stokes et al. 2013). If building leadership 
capacity among leaders from marginalised groups 
enables clientelist exchanges, it could ultimately 
undermine the quality of governance, rather than 
improving it.
Finally, equipping community leaders with the 
organisational and public-speaking skills needed for 
engagement may do little to overcome their fear of 
political retaliation from authorities (Tsai and Xu 2017; 
Givens 2011; Michelson 2007; Shi 1997). In developing 
democracies, where the rule of law is weak and there 
are no guarantees that one will not be punished in 
some way for criticising authorities, complaining about 
government performance can be a risky prospect. 
Newly developed participation and leadership skills 
may very well go unused in these contexts.
1.4 Building civic skills in the 
Philippines 
In many ways, the political context of the Philippines 
provides a ‘hard test’ for the theory that a civic skills 
training programme for community leaders can work. 
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Patronage and clientelism are pervasive, making co-
option by politicians a clear concern. Barangay officials 
also have a high degree of discretion over resources 
and governance, which may increase the risk and 
uncertainty associated with making complaints about 
their performance. 
In the context of the CCT programme, beneficiaries 
have several reasons to feel beholden to barangay 
officials. A common refrain in the barangays is that CCT 
beneficiaries assume barangay officials have a role to 
play in their selection for the programme – but in fact, 
the CCT programme is administered by the Department 
of Social Welfare and Development, with no involvement 
from barangay officials.
At the same time, compared to other developing 
countries, the civil society sector in the Philippines 
is highly developed in terms of organisation and 
political sophistication. Many CSOs are good at 
identifying potential allies in government and building 
relationships with them. Indeed, it is not unheard of 
for individuals to alternate between civil society and 
government. This ‘revolving door’ can make it easier for 
CSOs to negotiate the political system and command a 
certain status in working with local officials.
The unique innovations7 of the 4Ps in the Philippines 
provide an exciting opportunity to investigate whether 
new community leaders and networks can be created, 
organised and mobilised for civic engagement and 
social accountability. It is unusual among CCT 
7 While many Making All Voices Count projects and research examined technology innovations, our focus was the policy innovations 
in the 4Ps.
8 The first and second iterations began in February 2015 and November 2015, and covered five and seven municipalities, respectively.
9 A member of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who serves as liaison between the Department and the 
municipality.
programmes in that it creates a formal structure 
of beneficiaries and parent leaders. This creates 
an institutional framework, reinforced by frequent 
programming and organised activities, which provide 
the ‘scaffolding’ for community leaders to organise 
citizens – and for politicians to co-opt them into 
political efforts.
Given this context, the increased civic participation 
of parent leaders, and any action they take towards 
disrupting their existing power differential with 
barangay officials, is significant and merits attention. In 
an ideal world, we would be able to isolate the benefits 
of fostering civic skills among parent leaders from the 
information provided through civic education. However, 
we know from previous studies that information 
obtained via civic education is unlikely, by itself, to have 
an impact in this type of context. Therefore, assessing 
this ‘treatment bundle’ can only provide an initial 
assessment of whether civic skills training is effective.
Project i-Pantawid sought to substantially enhance 
the role of parent leaders. As a result, it provides a 
valuable opportunity to evaluate the impacts – both 
positive and negative – of such training. The results 
of our evaluation are discussed in more detail in the 
rest of this report, beginning with background and 
motivations, followed by an overview of the pilot 
intervention and research design, outcomes of interest, 
hypotheses and results, qualitative illustrations, and 
summary and implications.
2. Research design
In this study, we evaluated a group of 16 municipalities 
in which Project i-Pantawid began between May 
and July 2016. By the time of our data collection, 
which began in April 2017 (during the third batch of 
interventions), the project had been running in these 
municipalities for between 9 and 11 months.8 
2.1 Characteristics of the study 
sample
In our study sample, the typical parent leader is 
female, aged between 40 and 49, and has completed 
high school. Most (88%) were chosen by fellow 
CCT beneficiaries, either through an election or a 
consultation process, but 9% were chosen by the 
Municipal Link,9 and 2.5% by a barangay official. Like  
 
all CCT beneficiaries, the parent leaders are all among 
the poorest 20% of the country’s households – the 
4Ps’ target population. Appendix 1 contains summary 
statistics about the parent leaders in our sample. 
2.2 Treatment and control 
municipalities
To evaluate the impact of Project i-Pantawid, we 
randomly assigned the training programme to eight out 
of 16 total municipalities in the study sample. Before 
this iteration of Project i-Pantawid started, participating 
CSOs were asked to submit two potential municipalities 
in which they could implement the project. 
Municipalities in each pair had to be in the same 
province, have similar income levels, and be similar in  
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terms of population and number of CCT beneficiaries. 
The CSOs were also required to secure prior permission 
from the mayors in both municipalities.
One municipality from each pair was randomly 
selected by the research team to be part of Project 
i-Pantawid. The selected municipalities are hereafter 
referred to as ‘treatment municipalities’, and the others 
(where the project was not implemented) as ‘control 
municipalities’. The 16 municipalities in the study span 
five provinces in Northern Luzon: Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, 
Ilocos Sur, La Union and Pangasinan.
We collected data on attitudinal and self-reported 
behavioural outcomes from Project i-Pantawid through 
face-to-face interviews with barangay officials, parent 
leaders and CCT beneficiaries. All barangays within 
10 Variables are standardised by subtracting the mean of each variable from each observation and dividing by the standard deviation 
of that variable within the control group. The index is created by taking the average of the standardised component variables.
11 The inclusion of variables with little to no variation in an index can make it more difficult to detect meaningful differences between 
the treatment and control groups. 
each municipality were included in the survey. Within 
each barangay, we aimed to interview four barangay 
officials and six randomly selected CCT beneficiaries. 
Together with a third-party survey firm, MIT GOV/LAB 
trained interviewers, and then supervised them during 
the data-collection process. Between April and August 
2017, we conducted face-to-face interviews with 4,998 
respondents from 441 barangays (see Table 1). 
In addition to the survey, we trained participant 
observers (hired by the same third-party firm) to 
observe barangay assembly meetings in 333 of the 
441 barangays in the sample. The data from these 
observations are still being analysed and are thus not 
included in the main analysis; however, qualitative 
findings are included in Section 5.
Table 1. Respondents by municipality status (treatment / control)
Respondent type Control municipalities Treatment municipalities Total
CCT beneficiary 1,283 1,319 2,602
Barangay official 834 837 1,671
Parent leader 361 342 703
Parent leader and official (dual-role)* 11 11 22
Total respondents 2,489 2,509 4,998
Number of barangays 216 225 441
* A small number of parent leaders were also barangay officials. In the following analysis, they are treated as officials.
3. Outcomes of interest
3.1 Main outcomes
We investigated the impact of the civic leadership 
training provided by Project i-Pantawid on three 
main outcomes of interest: (1) political participation 
by parent leaders; (2) government responsiveness, 
as perceived by parent leaders, and in terms 
of compliance with government regulations on 
transparency and citizen feedback; and (3) the co-
option of parent leaders by officials.
In this section, we discuss each of these outcomes 
and the variables that we used to measure them. We 
created one index for each outcome by aggregating 
several different variables, standardising each 
variable and taking the equally weighted average, as 
recommended by Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007).10 To 
minimise ‘noise’, variables for which 95% of barangays 
had the same value within the full sample were omitted 
from the analysis.11 
1. Political participation by parent leaders 
One expected outcome from the civic leadership 
training provided by Project i-Pantawid was that 
parent leaders would participate more in local 
government processes. One of the main forums 
for citizen participation in the Philippines is the 
barangay assembly, a ‘town hall’ meeting at which 
barangay officials disseminate information about 
their activities and budgetary decisions, and solicit 
questions and comments from citizens. Barangay 
assemblies typically take place twice a year, in March 
and October. 
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The March assemblies coincided with the end of the 
Project i-Pantawid intervention in our study sample. 
We were therefore able to measure citizen participation 
at the barangay level by recording the attendance of 
ordinary citizens and parent leaders at the assembly, 
their level of participation in terms of comments and 
questions voiced to officials, and the general level of 
interest in local politics and community affairs among 
parent leaders. 
Table H1L12 lists the survey questions used to construct 
the index for citizen participation.13
2a. Government responsiveness I: as perceived 
by parent leaders
Another expectation of the project was that civic 
leadership training for parent leaders would lead to 
greater responsiveness by officials towards marginalised 
groups. Community leaders who undergo leadership 
training may be able to elicit greater responsiveness, 
through mechanisms such as being more effective – and 
feeling that they are more effective – at communicating 
their concerns, communicating their concerns more 
often, and mobilising other citizens to put pressure on 
officials to respond to questions and concerns.
One way of measuring government responsiveness 
is to look at citizens’ perceptions of government 
responsiveness. In our research, we measured this 
by asking: do parent leaders see barangay officials as 
being responsive to questions and complaints from 
citizens? 
Table H2A lists the questions used to construct the 
index for government responsiveness, as perceived by 
parent leaders.
2b. Government responsiveness II: barangay 
officials’ compliance with government 
regulations about transparency and citizen 
feedback
Another way of measuring government responsiveness 
is to look at the behaviour of barangay officials, and 
whether they comply with government regulations 
that require them to inform citizens about local 
government finances and the available channels for 
citizen input into local government decision-making 
processes. Specifically, these regulations include the 
need to: inform citizens in advance of the time and 
place for a barangay assembly; provide information 
about budgetary revenues and expenditures; report on 
present and future public projects in the barangay; and 
enable citizens to ask questions during the barangay 
assembly. 
12 The specific survey questions included in each index can be found in Appendices 3A and 3B.
13 A version of this index that uses responses from non-parent leader CCT beneficiaries is included as a secondary outcome. This is 
because, while we expect the main effects of the programme to be realised through parent leaders, there may also be spill-over 
effects to other beneficiaries. 
Table H2B details the variables used for this index, 
which aggregates responses from both parent leaders 
and other CCT beneficiaries.
3. Co-option of parent leaders by officials
One potential unintended consequence of training 
community leaders is that these leaders may become 
attractive targets for co-option by elected officials and 
may be recruited for vote-brokering during elections. 
Unfortunately, the barangay elections originally 
scheduled for October 2016 were postponed, initially 
until October 2017. This made it impossible to measure 
any effects on co-option during actual elections, as the 
dates when our survey took place meant it was likely 
to be too early to detect direct electoral co-option in 
anticipation of the October 2017 elections. 
In October 2017, just weeks before the rescheduled 
elections were set to take place, the elections were 
postponed for a second time, until May 2018. This 
possibility was being discussed publicly during the time 
of our survey, which created substantial uncertainty 
surrounding the date of the next elections and may 
have further delayed pre-campaign activities. 
Nevertheless, we proceeded by evaluating differences 
in co-option between treatment and control groups, 
with the understanding that if we were to find any 
impacts during a period when elections were not 
upcoming, it could be expected that this impact would 
intensify during an actual election season. 
The variables used to construct the attempted co-
option index are detailed in Table H3.
3.2 Secondary outcomes
To better understand some of the mechanisms through 
which civic leadership training for parent leaders may 
(or may not) lead to greater citizen participation, 
government responsiveness or elite co-option, we also 
assessed the impacts of the training interventions on 
several secondary outcomes. 
1. Levels of civic knowledge among parent 
leaders / CCT beneficiaries
One way in which leadership training for parent leaders 
could increase citizen participation and government 
responsiveness is by increasing the knowledge – of 
both parent leaders and other CCT beneficiaries, who 
receive it from the parent leaders – about core local 
government institutions and regulations for decision-
making and transparency. We created separate indices 
for parent leaders and CCT beneficiaries; the questions 
asked are listed in Table H1M.
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2. Levels of self-efficacy among parent leaders 
and CCT beneficiaries
The level of self-efficacy – the sense that an individual 
has about her or his ability to influence the decision-
making of others – has been shown to be important in 
political participation (Almond and Verba 1963). We 
created separate indices for parent leaders and CCT 
beneficiaries; and the questions asked, which are often 
used in public opinion surveys to measure internal 
efficacy, are listed in Table H5.
3. Perceptions of inequality between citizens 
and officials
Another mechanism through which leadership 
training may lead to greater citizen participation and 
government responsiveness is by decreasing the sense 
– felt by both citizens and officials – that theirs is a 
hierarchical relationship, in which citizens are expected 
to obey or defer to officials unquestioningly. We asked 
a series of questions to construct indices measuring 
subjective perceptions of inequality between citizens 
and officials. The index construction is described in 
Table H6.
4. Interactions between citizens and officials
The training provided by Project i-Pantawid could 
increase government responsiveness by increasing 
the amount of face-to-face interaction between parent 
leaders and local officials. While Project i-Pantawid 
does not directly facilitate interactions between 
parent leaders and elected officials at the barangay 
level, it may give parent leaders greater confidence 
to approach them. It may also be the case that more 
conversations and personal interactions between 
parent leaders and elected officials provide the latter 
group with more information about the community 
mobilisation skills and networks of parent leaders, and 
provide more opportunities for co-opting these leaders 
and recruiting them into patron–client relationships for 
vote-brokering.
We asked parent leaders about the levels of interaction 
between themselves and a variety of officials at the 
barangay and municipal levels. The index construction 
is described in Table H7.
5. Levels of collective action by parent leaders 
and CCT beneficiaries
Assessing the impact of the training intervention on 
the level of collective action among parent leaders 
and CCT beneficiaries was of interest for a number of 
reasons. Training parent leaders could increase their 
motivation and ability to organise CCT beneficiaries 
to voice questions and concerns to local officials, thus 
contributing to greater government responsiveness. 
However, a greater ability to organise collective action 
could also make parent leaders more attractive targets 
for co-option, or as organisers of citizen compliance 
with top-down initiatives, such as mandated 
contributions of labour to village clean-up campaigns. 
Table H8 lists the variables used for this index.
6. Local officials’ acknowledgment of parent 
leaders in barangay assembly meetings
We were interested in assessing whether training 
parent leaders made local officials more or less likely 
to increase the prominence of such leaders during 
barangay assembly meetings. We selected these 
forums because they are perhaps the most significant 
public forum for barangays. Variables for this index 
were constructed using either parent leader and / or 
CCT beneficiary responses, as indicated in Table H9.
Political participation by CCT beneficiaries, and 
perceptions of government responsiveness by CCT 
beneficiaries, are considered secondary outcomes. 
While we expect the intervention to operate primarily 
through its impact on parent leaders, we also test 
for potential secondary effects on CCT beneficiaries 
who are not parent leaders. These indices are 
constructed as described, but using responses from 
CCT beneficiaries rather than parent leaders, unless 
otherwise noted.
4. Hypotheses tested and results
We tested 16 hypotheses relating to the impacts of 
the training interventions on the outcomes described 
in Section 3. Due to the small sample size – 16 
municipalities – we did not assess the statistical 
significance of an average ‘treatment’ effect using 
conventional standard errors that rely on distributional 
assumptions. Instead, we use a non-parametric 
permutation procedure to test a sharp null hypothesis 
of a constant zero treatment effect (Efron and 
Tibshirani 1993). This is intended to tell us whether we 
can reject the sharp null hypothesis: that none of the 
municipalities was affected by the intervention (see 
Appendix 2 for more details).
To address the increased risk of falsely rejecting the 
null hypotheses – a risk introduced by testing the effect 
of the intervention on multiple outcomes – we applied 
a multiple testing adjustment. However, in accordance 
with our pre-analysis plan, we report both unadjusted 
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p-values obtained from the permutation test and p-values 
adjusted for multiple testing (see Appendix 2).14 
Tables 2 and 3 summarise our hypotheses and the 
indices that measure our outcomes of interest. The 
four hypotheses in Table 2 are our primary hypotheses, 
and the 12 hypotheses in Table 3 are the secondary 
hypotheses. Our primary hypotheses involve our main 
outcomes of interest (see Section 3.1). Our secondary 
hypotheses assess whether the training interventions 
affect these main outcomes through more intermediate 
outcomes, which are associated with greater 
engagement, and whether the interventions affected 
the engagement and participation of CCT beneficiaries 
who are not parent leaders (see Section 3.2).
For each hypothesis, we report: the direction of the 
difference from control to treatment; the estimated 
14 The p-value represents the probability that we would find a difference as large as, or larger than, the one we found if the treatment 
had no effect on any municipality. The smaller the p-value, the less likely it is that the difference we find is due to random chance. 
Note that this differs from a conventional hypothesis test that yields a probability of observing the effect we observe, given that 
the ‘true’ effect of the intervention is zero (Efron and Tibshirani 1993).
effect size of the treatment; and the statistical 
significance of this difference. Effect sizes are reported 
for standardised indices measuring each outcome. 
These effect sizes are generally comparable across 
outcomes, so a larger effect size indicates that the 
treatment may have had a more sizable impact (than 
others) on a particular outcome.
In the column on statistical significance, we follow the 
standard of a 0.05 significance level for the p-values, 
obtained by permutation inference after adjusting for 
multiple hypothesis testing. If the difference was not 
significant at this level, we did not reject the sharp 
null hypothesis that none of the municipalities was 
affected by the intervention, but noted this finding 
in the column reporting statistical significance. 
However, to benchmark our results against the results 
reported in other studies, which often use other 
Table 2. Primary hypotheses and results
No. Hypothesis* Index Observed effect Effect size Statistical 
significance
H1L Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
lead to greater participation 
by those leaders in local 
government processes
Citizen 
participation 
(parent leaders)
Increases, as 
expected
0.77 Not significant
(unadjusted 
p-value 
significant at 
0.10 level)
H2AL Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
lead to greater perceived 
responsiveness by officials 
to those groups (among 
group leaders)
Government 
responsiveness 
(perceived 
– parent leaders)
Decreases, not as 
expected
−0.49 Not significant
H2B Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
lead to greater compliance 
with procedures for 
transparency and citizen 
participation 
Government 
responsiveness 
(compliance)
Increases, as 
expected
0.37 Not significant
H3 Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
lead to attempted co-option 
of those leaders by elected 
officials
Co-option Decreases, not as 
expected
−0.30 Not significant
* Hypotheses appear as stated in our pre-analysis plan.
14
The effect of civic leadership training on citizen engagement and government 
responsiveness: experimental evidence from the PhilippinesRESEARCH REPORT
Table 3. Secondary hypotheses and results
No. Hypothesis Index Observed effect Effect 
size
Statistical 
significance
H1M Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will lead 
to greater participation by 
members of groups in local 
government processes
Citizen 
participation 
(CCT 
beneficiaries)
Increases, as 
expected
0.01 Not significant
H2AM Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
lead to greater perceived 
responsiveness by officials 
to groups (group members)
Government 
responsiveness 
(perceived 
– CCT 
beneficiaries)
Increases, as 
expected
0.11 Not significant
H4L Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
increase knowledge of local 
government processes and 
procedures 
Civic knowledge 
(parent leaders)
Increases, as 
expected
1.39 Not significant 
(unadjusted 
p-value 
significant at 
0.05 level)
H4M Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
increase knowledge of local 
government processes and 
procedures among members 
of groups
Civic knowledge 
(CCT 
beneficiaries)
Increases, as 
expected
0.38 Not significant
H5L Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will lead 
to greater self-efficacy 
among those leaders
Self-efficacy 
(parent leaders)
Increases, as 
expected
0.35 Not significant
H5M Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
lead to greater self-efficacy 
among members of groups
Self-efficacy 
(CCT 
beneficiaries)
Increases, as 
expected
0.38 Not significant
H6L Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
decrease perceived power 
differentials between leaders 
and officials (as perceived by 
leaders)
Power 
differential 
(parent leaders)
Decreases, as 
expected
−0.51 Not significant
H6M Civic leadership training 
for community leaders 
from marginalised groups 
will decrease perceived 
power differentials between 
members of groups and 
officials (as perceived by 
group members)
Power 
differential (CCT 
beneficiaries)
Decreases, as 
expected
−0.11 Not significant
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levels of significance and do not use multiple testing 
adjustments, we also report in this column whether the 
difference would be considered statistically significant 
without adjustment at other, conventionally used levels 
of significance.
Overall, there is a consistent pattern across both 
primary and secondary outcomes measuring citizen 
engagement in terms of behaviour, attitudes and 
skills. This consistent pattern of positive differences 
suggests that the training intervention was 
effective in its intended goals: it increased citizen 
engagement, though the small number of units 
in the study make it difficult to detect statistical 
significance. Given the substantively large effects 
for many of these outcomes, these results support 
the case for expanding this pilot intervention to 
further municipalities. The remainder of this section 
discusses these results in more detail.
4.1 Results for primary hypotheses
Citizen participation in local government processes 
was much higher among the treatment group of parent 
15 The unadjusted p-value for this difference is 0.08. To benchmark these findings against findings reported in previous studies, it is 
worth noting that many studies do not use multiple hypothesis-testing adjustments. In such studies, this difference would be 
considered statistically significant at a 90% confidence level.
leaders, who received civic leadership training, than the 
control group (Table 2, H1L). However, this difference 
did not meet the level of statistical significance 
specified in our pre-analysis plan.15
Table 4 outlines the differences between the treatment 
and control groups for the individual components 
of our participation index. Looking at these, it 
becomes clear that most or all of the difference in our 
index is driven by parent leaders’ participation and 
engagement, rather than the participation of ordinary 
CCT beneficiaries or other citizens in a barangay. 
Parent leaders in the treatment group score their 
interest in local community politics and affairs as 3.8 
on average (mean), while parent leaders in the control 
group report an average score of 3.5. 
Even more meaningful differences exist in terms of 
parent leaders’ behaviour in barangay assemblies. 
The mean percentage of parent leaders attending a 
barangay assembly in the treatment group was 89%, 
compared to 80% in the control group. Similarly, the 
mean percentage of barangays in the treatment group 
reporting that their parent leaders made comments 
No. Hypothesis Index Observed effect Effect 
size
Statistical 
significance
H6O Civic leadership training 
for community leaders 
from marginalised groups 
will decrease perceived 
power differentials between 
members of groups and 
officials (as perceived by 
officials)
Power 
differential 
(officials)
Decreases, as 
expected
0.16 Not significant
H7 Civic leadership training 
for community leaders 
from marginalised groups 
will increase interactions 
between leaders / members 
and officials
Interaction Increases, as 
expected
0.44 Not significant 
(unadjusted 
p-value 
significant at 
0.10 level)
H8 Civic leadership training for 
community leaders from 
marginalised groups will 
increase citizen participation 
in local collective work
Collective work Increases, as 
expected
0.48 Not significant
H9 Civic leadership training 
for community leaders 
from marginalised groups 
will increase the salience 
of groups to government 
officials
Salience Decreases, not 
as expected
−0.55 Not significant
Table 3. Continued
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during the barangay assembly is 25%, as opposed to 
19% in the control group. 
By contrast, there was little difference between the 
treatment and control groups in the attendance of CCT 
beneficiaries. The treatment group actually had slightly 
lower rates of attendance by ordinary residents than 
the control group (although this difference is small,  
just 4%). 
Keeping in mind that none of the differences was 
close to being statistically significant by any standard, 
other large differences between treatment and control 
groups that merit further investigation include the 
following. 
• Compliance with government regulations on 
transparency and citizen input (H2B) was higher 
among barangay officials in the treatment group. 
Much of the overall difference in compliance was 
due to the treatment group’s much higher rates of 
compliance with regulations on budget transparency 
(e.g. posting a written budget in a publicly accessible 
place and verbally presenting budgetary information 
during barangay assembly meetings). 
• The co-option of parent leaders (H23) was 
substantially lower in barangays in the treatment 
group, with little evidence of increased clientelism 
in their relationships with politicians. This is 
consistent with the generally positive impacts on 
civic engagement that these leaders have had.
There was little difference in citizens’ perceptions 
of government responsiveness to citizen complaints 
and concerns (H2AL).
16 The unadjusted p-value for this difference is 0.02. Benchmarking these findings against others reported in previous studies that are 
not adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing, this difference would be considered statistically significant at a 95% confidence level.
17 The unadjusted p-value for this difference is 0.10, which would be considered statistically significant at a 90% confidence level in 
studies that do not adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
18 The unadjusted p-value for this difference is 0.09, which would be considered statistically significant at a 90% confidence level in 
studies that do not adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
4.2 Results for secondary 
hypotheses
As stated, our hypothesis was that Project i-Pantawid 
operates primarily through its impact on parent 
leaders, but we were also interested in potential 
‘downstream’ effects on other CCT beneficiaries as 
secondary outcomes. All but one of the 12 secondary 
outcomes showed a difference between treatment 
and control in the expected direction (Table 3). Again, 
this consistent pattern increases our belief in the 
potential of civic leadership training to increase citizen 
engagement. 
The differences between secondary outcomes in 
treatment and control municipalities about which we 
are most confident are: 
• the civic knowledge of parent leaders (H4L): newly 
trained parent leaders showed greater knowledge of 
the governance system and citizens’ rights16
• feelings of self-efficacy (H5L): they also expressed 
stronger beliefs that people like them could influence 
government decisions17 
• the level of face-to-face interactions between 
parent leaders and local officials (H7): the average 
percentage of parent leaders who reported speaking 
to local officials – both barangay and municipal 
officials – with whom they had never previously 
spoken was higher in treatment municipalities. They 
also interacted more frequently with barangay and 
municipal officials.18 
As an example, barangays in treatment municipalities 
saw more interactions between parent leaders and the 
Table 4. Differences between control and treatment groups in the citizen participation index (H1L)
General interest in engagement Control Treatment
Self-reported interest of parent leaders in local community politics and local 
community affairs (on a scale of 1–5, with 5 being the highest)
3.5 3.8
Behavioural engagement in the most recent barangay assembly Control (%) Treatment (%)
Average percentage of parent leaders in a barangay that attended 80 89
Average percentage of barangays that reported that the parent leader made 
comments during the assembly
19 25
Average percentage of barangay residents who attended 55 51
Average percentage of CCT beneficiaries who attended 86 86
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barangay captain than those in control municipalities 
(a difference of 7%), and more interactions between 
parent leaders and the barangay treasurer or secretary 
(17% more). They also saw more interactions between 
parent leaders and the municipal mayor (14%), and 
with someone from the mayor’s office, including the 
mayor (57%). 
The level of collective work activities within barangays 
(H8) was higher in treatment barangays, as expected, 
but we are less certain about this difference. On 
average, barangays in the treatment group organised 
more collective work activities (e.g. village sweeping, 
school cleaning, community patrols) and beneficiaries 
participated in these activities at higher rates.
Estimated differences in perceptions of the power 
differential between officials and citizens (H6L, H6M, 
H6O) were highly uncertain.
As we expected, there was little evidence that the 
impacts of the training interventions extended to CCT 
beneficiaries and citizens who did not receive the civic 
19 Barangay assembly observers were English teachers in public elementary schools, contracted through the Department of Education. 
They were either residents of the barangay they observed, or taught in that barangay’s elementary school. They were instructed not 
to give too much prior notice to the barangay captain about their observation, and only inform him the day before it started.
leadership training (i.e. those who were not parent 
leaders). Although the differences in citizens’ attitudes 
and behaviour between the treatment and control 
groups were consistent with the intervention potentially 
affecting citizen engagement positively, these estimates 
were, for the most part, highly uncertain.
Finally, there was some indication that barangay 
officials may have changed their behaviour in response 
to changes in the parent leaders who completed 
civic leadership training. We hypothesised that more 
active parent leaders would increase their prominence 
during barangay assemblies, and that barangay 
officials would be more likely to discuss parent leaders’ 
activities during these assemblies. Instead, we found 
that barangay officials in the treatment group were 
significantly less likely to mention parent leaders during 
assembly meetings. This suggests that the impact of 
the training interventions was not limited to the parent 
leaders who received the training, but that changes 
in their behaviour may have led to changes in the 
behaviour of barangay officials. 
5. Interpreting citizen voice and 
engagement qualitatively
5.1 Unpacking citizen participation: 
voice and engagement in barangay 
assemblies
The results discussed in Section 4 suggest that parent 
leaders who received civic training participated in 
local government processes at higher rates than 
those who did not receive the training. But what 
does citizen participation mean in this setting? Our 
index of participation draws primarily on indicators of 
attendance and voice in barangay assembly meetings, 
the primary forum available to citizens for voicing their 
requests and concerns to barangay officials publicly. 
The barangay assembly is a ‘town hall’ meeting at 
which barangay officials disseminate information 
about their activities and budgetary decisions, 
and solicit questions and comments from citizens. 
Generally, officials use these meetings to report on 
which public projects have been, or will be, carried 
out; provide information about government regulations 
that higher levels want delivered or underscored to 
the public; and make public service announcements 
about topics such as fire safety or, during 2017, the 
anti-drugs campaign launched by President Rodrigo 
Duterte. 
Our index of citizen participation was constructed from 
survey responses to five questions – four of which 
related to participation at the barangay assembly 
meeting by parent leaders, CCT beneficiaries and 
other citizens. As noted in Section 4.1 and Table 4, 
the differences in citizen participation between the 
treatment and control groups were largely driven by 
higher rates of attendance in barangay assemblies 
by parent leaders, and higher numbers of comments 
and questions voiced by parent leaders during these 
meetings. For ordinary CCT beneficiaries, however, 
there was little difference in attendance, and for non-
beneficiary residents, the treatment group actually 
had slightly lower rates of attendance than the control 
group.
In this section, we take a closer look at the nature of 
parent leaders’ participation in barangay assembly 
meetings, drawing on qualitative information collected 
through two channels. First, we trained participant 
observers19 hired by a local research firm to log all 
comments and questions made by citizens and local 
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officials during assembly meetings in 333 barangays 
held from mid-March to May 2017.20 Second, we 
personally observed six barangay assembly meetings 
on an opportunistic basis (primarily determined by the 
timing of assemblies, which coincided with our training 
sessions for survey enumerators) to collect our own 
observations and help us cross-check and interpret the 
information collected by the participant observers.
We used these data in two ways to illustrate what 
citizen participation, and interactions between citizens 
and local officials, look like in reality. 
1. In Section 5.2, based on a preliminary reading 
of the barangay assembly logs, we construct a 
typology of citizens’ comments and questions. This 
demonstrates the variety that exists in citizen voice 
and engagement with local officials, and provides 
concrete examples of what citizens actually say in 
barangay assemblies.21
2. In Section 5.3, we narrate the proceedings of one 
barangay assembly that we personally attended in 
the treatment group. This illustrates how citizens 
and officials interact dynamically in these public 
forums, and contextualises the significance and 
limitations of these interactions. Benchmarked 
against the typology of citizen input across all 
barangay assemblies, we can see that the input 
voiced by parent leaders and citizens falls at the 
critical end of the spectrum.
5.2 Typology of parent leaders’ 
participation in barangay assembly 
meetings
We found that parent leaders voiced a range of 
comments and questions during barangay assemblies, 
ranging from supportive comments to criticisms of 
barangay officials. The following types of input are 
listed here, illustrated with examples taken from the 
assembly logs submitted by barangay observers. 
The six types presented are ordered from positive 
to negative, with 1 being participation that is most 
positive towards barangay officials, and 6 the most 
challenging of their authority.
1. Positive comments that express agreement with the 
officials:
20 In total, 108 of the 441 barangay assemblies were unobserved: 41 were held in early to mid-March, before the recruitment and 
training of observers could be completed; 26 were held in January / February 2017, ahead of the government-issued guideline date 
of 25 March 2017; in 14, the observer was unavailable on the day of the assembly; in 13, no observer could be recruited through the 
Department of Education; in 7, the observer did not know the date of the assembly because it was rescheduled; in 5, the observer 
remained unreachable, and the status of observation is not known; in 2, the observer reported that no assembly had taken place. Of 
the 333 barangays observed, data is available only from 322. Data sets from 11 barangay assemblies, though observed, were not 
submitted by the observer).
21 We only received the complete set of barangay assembly data in October 2017. At the time of writing, we have not yet coded this for 
systematic analysis of differences between treatment and control groups, although we plan to look at these differences in the next 
phase of our research.
22 A kagawad is an elected member of the barangay council; each council consists of a captain, secretary, treasurer and seven kagawads.
• “I agree with him [the kagawad].22 We should 
have a popularity contest for the barangay fiesta.”
2. Factual / logistical questions or statements:
• “Is there a penalty for non-participation in the 
barangay fiesta?”
3. Complaints about other residents of the barangay 
(note that this type of comment pertains to the 
behaviour of citizens, not officials):
• A parent leader complained that business 
establishments in the barangay, such as bars, 
were not complying with agreed curfew times. 
The barangay captain acknowledged this point 
and said he would seek municipal advice on how 
to deal with them. 
• At the end of a speech by an officer from the 
Department of Interior and Local Government 
about the problems of drugs and gambling, a 
parent leader asked for help from the barangay 
officials to help control the CCT beneficiaries 
who gamble. The officer advised all beneficiaries 
against gambling, which is illegal.
4. General suggestions that do not explicitly challenge 
the authorities:
• A parent leader suggested that every family 
should send a member to participate in the 
school-cleaning activity; the barangay captain 
agreed.
5. Requests made to officials on behalf of the 
community:
• A parent leader requested streetlights for Sitio 
[neighbourhood] Six, which the barangay captain 
immediately approved.
• A parent leader made a request on behalf of the 
CCT (4Ps) beneficiaries, which was approved: 
“May we request, from the barangay fund, an 
amount for purchasing the needs of 4Ps members 
[in] our barangay?” 
6. Critical comments or suggestions / questions 
challenging authority: 
• “May we request [that] the income and 
expenditures of [the] barangay [are] posted 
in two to three different places – maybe at the 
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elementary school, barangay hall and [an] 
outpost?”
• After the treasurer’s financial report for the 
previous year was presented, a parent leader 
asked: “What did you spend all the money on? 
You need to provide us [with] more information.” 
The Treasurer proceeded to elaborate on the 
breakdown of the expenses.
• During the question and answer section of the 
assembly, a parent leader suggested that health 
equipment, such as the glucometer and nebuliser, 
should be available at all times (which was not 
happening as it should be), and that the head 
barangay health worker23 should keep them to 
avoid conflicts. 
5.3 When citizens engage: the case 
of Barangay Salog’s assembly 
meeting
Until all the data from our observations of barangay 
assemblies are processed and analysed, we cannot 
provide concrete findings about the relative distribution 
of these types of citizen engagement in barangays, 
or differences in their use in treatment and control 
municipalities. However, we can illustrate how citizen 
participation played out in one treatment barangay, 
which we will refer to as Salog.24 
The Salog assembly that was observed was 
characterised not only by relatively high levels of 
citizen participation, but by participation that explicitly 
challenged and criticised local officials. In this section, 
we use observations from the assembly to explore the 
potential and limitations of engagement by parent 
leaders and citizens in this context. 
Background
Salog is located in a highly developed province in 
the Philippines. It is relatively small, with around 
900 residents and 200 households. Like many other 
barangays in the area, Salog consists of several 
scattered settlements (sitios), with fields interspersed 
among small clusters of houses. Relative to barangays 
in other municipalities, Salog appears to receive a lot 
of funding and projects coming from higher levels of 
government. 
It is located in a municipality where dominant political 
families have been engaged in intense, and sometimes 
violent, conflict for the last few years. This conflict has 
impinged on barangay governance, with the former 
barangay captain reportedly fearing for his life and 
23 A barangay health worker is a volunteer who provides frontline primary care services.
24 The name Salog, and the names of the individuals quoted, have been changed to preserve their anonymity. We have also eliminated 
details that could, either individually or in combination, identify the barangay. While barangay assemblies are public, and therefore 
not subject to confidentiality requirements, the case description provided includes information obtained from the survey; 
respondents were told this would not be disclosed alongside any personally identifiable information.
fleeing abroad after falling out of favour with the 
current municipal mayor. Regular meetings of barangay 
captains in this municipality, normally scheduled for 
each month, have not taken place for most of the year, 
reportedly due to security concerns. The new barangay 
captain in Salog, who took office recently, seems to act 
with great caution. Meetings are only held in carefully 
considered locations. 
The observed barangay assembly 
As with many barangays, Salog holds its assembly 
meeting in a dedicated public space (similar to a village 
square). In some barangays, such spaces are paved 
in concrete and covered with roofs made of grass 
or corrugated tin sheets. In other places, barangay 
officials conduct the assemblies in schoolyards or on 
the steps of public buildings.
The assembly that we observed in Salog started an hour 
late and was relatively brief, lasting one hour (from 9am 
to 10am). Twenty-five people, mostly CCT beneficiaries, 
arrived promptly at 8am. By 9am, the crowd had 
more than doubled, with 30 women and 22 men in 
attendance. The officials cleared the chairs near to the 
stage, in an attempt to get participants to sit nearer to 
them, but the seats closest to the front remained empty. 
Attendance was low relative to the other barangay 
assembly meetings we observed, possibly due to the 
Friday morning market, where many of the residents, 
who are vegetable farmers, sell their produce. 
Nevertheless, given that Salog has approximately 200 
households, and that the norm is for each household to 
send one person, it is likely that as many as one quarter 
of the barangay’s households were represented.
The meeting began, as most assemblies do, with 
prepared remarks from each of the officials. These 
lasted a few minutes each and provided updates on 
barangay affairs. These remarks were then followed by 
an open forum for comments and questions from the 
crowd, during which several citizens provided updates. 
In most assemblies that we observed, including 
Salog, citizens rarely spoke during the first part of the 
meetings; instead, their participation usually came 
during the open forum. 
The parent leader’s participation
Salog has one parent leader, Carmen, who is in her 
early 40s and has served in the position since the 
inception of Project i-Pantawid in the municipality, in 
2012. She was appointed by the Municipal Link, rather 
than elected by fellow beneficiaries. She also works in 
the barangay’s day care centre. 
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Consistent with our hypothesised concerns about 
parent leaders being attractive targets for politicians to 
co-opt, Carmen reported being approached to work as 
a party coordinator for the 2016 elections, but said she 
did not accept the offer. She also reported that recently, 
she has been interacting with the barangay captain and 
officials less than she used to, perhaps only once in the 
past 6–12 months. 
At the observed barangay assembly meeting, however, 
she spoke for the CCT beneficiaries and asked probing 
questions directed at the barangay officials. In one of 
her exchanges, she told the officials that they should 
take more responsibility for the cleanliness of the 
barangay, and that they should ask all members of 
the community to clean the village and village school, 
rather than just the CCT beneficiaries. As noted, 
officials often mislead CCT beneficiaries by linking, 
either implicitly or explicitly, their cash transfers to 
additional work ‘owed’ to the barangay, when in fact 
their cash transfers are not tied to such duties. 
By demanding that everyone in the community should 
take responsibility for these chores, Carmen showed 
that she was aware of the rights of CCT beneficiaries, 
that she cared about representing their interests, 
and that she felt sufficiently confident and skilled to 
challenge the barangay officials for not protecting their 
rights. 
In response, the barangay officials conceded her 
point, but told her that she and the beneficiaries 
should take the initiative to inform each household 
of the dates of the cleanings, so that everyone knew 
when to participate. By acknowledging the legitimacy 
of her criticisms in front of the barangay, the officials 
gave the CCT beneficiaries public backing for refusing 
to shoulder the burden of these duties on their own. 
However, they put the onus to inform the community 
back on the beneficiaries; it is unclear whether the CCT 
beneficiaries will be able to enforce compliance from 
their neighbours, particularly those with higher status.
Carmen followed this comment with a related criticism. 
Observing that the barangay officials are on duty for 
24 hours a day at the barangay hall (as part of the 
community crime watches that are required by the 
national anti-drugs campaign), she said that they 
should spend some of that time on the upkeep of public 
spaces, for example cleaning the barangay hall and 
mowing and weeding the grounds: “Now, they [the 
officials] are just sitting while on duty.” Put on the spot 
in front of the community, the officials again conceded 
Carmen’s point and agreed to start mowing the grass 
around the barangay hall.
As Table 4 shows, parent leaders made comments 
during assemblies in only 19% of control group 
barangays. The fact that Carmen not only made inputs 
25 A tanod is a barangay police officer; this is separate from those of the Philippine National Police. A tanod reports to the barangay captain.
during the assembly meeting, but asked questions 
that were pointed and critical of the barangay officials, 
makes her an example of a highly active parent leader 
– one with unusually high confidence and efficacy 
in her actions. As a result, she is able to represent 
the interests of CCT beneficiaries and hold barangay 
officials accountable for governance and the provision 
of public services.
Citizen participation
After remarks by various officials from the barangay 
council, the tanod,25 the barangay health worker 
and the head of the senior citizens’ group provided 
brief updates on their groups’ activities. The head 
reported on the total number of senior citizens in 
Salog, following the deaths of two people since the 
last assembly. She also announced that the death aid 
provided to each person’s family was 100 pesos.
Following on from the parent leader’s comments, a 
male citizen was similarly critical of the barangay 
officials, asserting that those on duty at the barangay 
hall ought to keep the area clean. In response, the 
barangay secretary acknowledged his point, admitting 
their mistake and requesting patience towards officials 
who may have shirked some of their duties. But after 
this, he gently noted: “All must have self-discipline. 
There are a lot of things to be done in the barangay, 
and we should have peace and unity.”
Another middle-aged male citizen then called barangay 
officials to account for their administration of a 
government welfare assistance programme, in which 
livestock are distributed to citizens on a rotating basis. 
In this exchange, the speaker alluded to possible 
wrongdoing by the officials in the disbursal and 
allocation of the livestock. 
To begin with, he asked the barangay officials (in this 
case, kagawads) to report on the status of the pig 
disbursement. 
Citizen: “What happened with the pig 
[disbursement]?”
Kagawad: “At present, there are three pigs available 
for [disbursement]. Two [others] have died.”
Citizen: “Please [proceed with] the pig 
[disbursement]. It [the scheme] 
hasn’t passed onto others since 
2002.”
Kagawad: “The first issued pigs are dead. At 
present, we have only three pigs.”
The citizen then turned to the disbursement of cows in 
the programme, and asked the officials whether these 
were indeed distributed to barangay residents, as per 
the programme’s requirements. 
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Citizen: “What about cow [disbursement]?”
Kagawad: “That was issued to [person 1]. He gave it 
to [person 2] to take care, but unfortunately 
it died.”
Citizen: “Is [ person 2] from this barangay?”
Kagawad: “At the time of [disbursement], he was 
residing in the barangay, but he later built 
his house in [a nearby barangay].”
In response to this, the citizen expressed dissatisfaction 
with how the barangay officials have administered the 
programme and asked them how they are going to do 
better. The discussion became confrontational, and 
another barangay resident, a CCT beneficiary, jumped 
into the discussion.
Citizen: [Addressing all barangay officials] “This 
should be solved. How can we solve the 
problem?”
Kagawad: “We shall have a meeting to decide what 
is the right thing to do, estimate its value, 
and decide [on] the qualified recipient.”
Citizen: “You should bring forth the value of pig as 
money for the next [disbursement].”
Kagawad: “The money is ready. Qualified 
applicants will be chosen for the pig 
[disbursement].”
CCT 
beneficiary: 
“It is better to buy a pig than to give 
money to the recipient, because people 
will spend money on other things, not 
pigs.”
Kagawad: “If you don’t trust your fellow citizens, 
you will not have a bright future!”
Reflections
While we do not yet know how representative Salog 
is of other treatment barangays, it suggests what 
relatively high engagement by parent leaders and 
citizens looks like. On one hand, it demonstrates 
that barangay assembly meetings can provide an 
opportunity for citizens to voice their questions and 
concerns to officials. Citizens – even those from the 
poorest, least educated, and lowest status households 
in the community – can become confident enough 
to utilise these opportunities to speak up, criticise 
barangay officials for their behaviour, and call them to 
account for their decisions. Salog also illustrates how 
parent leaders can become new community leaders, 
representing previously marginalised voices. 
As we had feared based on our preliminary fieldwork, 
the case of Carmen being approached by officials 
shows how this new status – as leaders who can 
mobilise poor people – makes parent leaders an 
attractive target for politicians. But there is another 
positive here: consistent with components of the 
leadership training that seek to socialise parent leaders 
as civic leaders and ‘inoculate’ them against such 
approaches, Carmen turned down this offer.
On the other hand, the case of Salog suggests 
that there are limitations to citizen engagement in 
these assemblies. It remains unclear the extent to 
which citizens can sanction barangay officials for 
incompetence or wrongdoing, or create incentives 
for better performance. In Salog, barangay officials 
responded positively to ‘low-cost’ suggestions, but 
were more resistant to changes with higher stakes. 
For example, Carmen and another citizen suggested 
that barangay officials set a good example to the rest 
of the community by using their time during crime 
watches to clean the hall and public square. This is, 
essentially, a request that officials do a little more 
than just sit around. This suggestion has few political 
consequences and is therefore easier for officials to 
implement. By contrast, criticisms of the livestock 
allocation programme related to the distribution of 
valuable resources, which are often distributed to 
political supporters. Problems like these, which have 
deeper political roots, are more difficult for citizens – 
even active and engaged ones – to change.
6. Summary and implications
The initial results from the Project i-Pantawid 
intervention suggest that civic training for community 
leaders has the potential to increase citizens’ 
participation and engagement in local governance. 
Parent leaders who received the civic training attended 
local town hall meetings at higher rates and spoke up 
at these meetings at more often, compared to those 
who didn’t receive training. They also had higher levels 
of interest in local community politics and affairs, 
higher levels of knowledge about local government 
systems and citizens’ rights, stronger self-belief (i.e. 
that someone like them could influence government 
decisions), and more face-to-face interactions with 
local officials.
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Project i-Pantawid provided civic education to all 
CCT beneficiaries, both parent leaders (directly) and 
‘ordinary’ beneficiaries (via parent leaders ‘cascading’ 
this education at family development sessions). 
However, although the project was intensive and 
sustained over a long period of time (relative to other 
civic education and empowerment interventions), the 
effects on knowledge, attitudes and behaviour were, for 
the most part, limited to parent leaders. 
These findings suggest two important lessons, which 
suggest possible directions for future research on the 
effects of civic leadership and education initiatives on 
citizen participation and government responsiveness. 
The first is the importance of putting civic skills into 
practice, rather than simply providing information. All 
CCT beneficiaries in Project i-Pantawid municipalities 
were provided with information about their rights 
and the government’s responsibilities, and were 
involved in evaluating government performance 
through scorecards and interface meetings. However, 
only the parent leaders had monthly opportunities 
(for more than a year) to practise their leadership, 
organisational and public-speaking skills – all of which 
are essential to interacting with government officials 
and influencing their decisions. Further, only parent 
leaders were tasked with ‘cascading’ or disseminating 
information from their monthly training workshops 
to the other CCT beneficiaries in their barangay. 
This was a further opportunity to put their skills into 
practice, as they were required to speak in public 
settings, answer questions during meetings and 
explain materials. 
The second direction is the potential benefits of 
focusing explicitly on building leadership capacity 
within communities, in addition to providing information 
to individual citizens. In particular, targeting individuals 
who have already been identified as potential 
leaders among marginalised groups may boost the 
impact of civic education interventions. Since only 
people with pre-existing leadership roles were given 
opportunities to use their participation and leadership 
skills, we cannot disentangle these two mechanisms 
in the current study, but looking separately at these 
mechanisms could be fruitful for future research.
There were also indications from our research that 
local officials were starting to shift their behaviour 
in response to these changes among parent leaders. 
Though further investigation is needed into all of these 
preliminary findings, the data suggest that Project 
i-Pantawid is achieving some of its intended goals. 
Given that there are many development initiatives 
aimed at empowering poor and marginalised groups, 
we asked which characteristics of Project i-Pantawid 
26 On collaboration and confrontation, see: Guerzovich and Tsai (2014); Fung and Kosack (2013); Joshi and Houtzager (2012); O’Meally 
(2013); Guerzovich (2010); Menocal and Sharma (2008); and Keck and Sikkink (1998). 
and its implementers might have contributed to 
this effectiveness. Taking into account learning 
exchanges and ideas from long-term collaborating 
partners, we suggest the following are critical 
aspects:
• Local leadership. Project i-Pantawid is well run 
by a coalition of organisations that have worked 
together before. These organisations are embedded 
in an active and established civil society sector, and 
have deep roots and long-standing relationships 
with local communities. They are also all local to 
Northern Luzon, not managed by a lead organisation 
in the capital.
• Sustained programming. Building on the findings 
of a thorough pilot initiative, Project i-Pantawid was 
designed to provide sustained, intensive training, 
occurring once a month for 11–14 months. In 
addition, our research focused on the third iteration 
of the project. The first two iterations allowed 
for adjustments to the management and design 
of the programme, based on the experience of 
implementing organisations and feedback from 
beneficiaries. This meant that the training provided 
improved over time.
• Support within government. Project i-Pantawid was 
designed with active support from the national and 
local offices of the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development. This connection was made possible 
in part due to a constructive working relationship 
between the project’s implementers and the 
Department’s secretary at the time, who had come 
from a CSO background.
These characteristics, combined with our preliminary 
findings on the impacts of the intervention, illustrate 
how both constructive and adversarial dynamics 
between citizens and officials can be at play within 
the same programme.26 There was constructive 
engagement between local civil society actors and the 
national government, which meant the project was 
successful and may have helped to increase citizen 
participation and engagement.
At the same time, there were suggestions in our 
research findings that increased citizen engagement 
by newly trained parent leaders may have led to 
changes in the relationships between citizens 
and local barangay officials, with these becoming 
more adversarial. In these instances, constructive 
engagement between civil society actors and 
sympathetic higher-level government authorities may 
have enabled citizens to take advantage of political 
resources from outside of their communities to change 
this dynamic and disrupt the pre-existing equilibrium 
between themselves and barangay officials.
23
The effect of civic leadership training on citizen engagement and government 
responsiveness: experimental evidence from the PhilippinesRESEARCH REPORT
Most researchers view constructive engagement and 
adversarial tactics as being in opposition to each 
other, and there has been a growing consensus that 
the political context in which a social accountability 
project is implemented should influence a CSO’s choice 
of political strategy. However, the case of Project 
i-Pantawid raises the question of whether constructive 
engagement and adversarial strategies can operate at 
different levels within the same initiative, and suggests 
they may in fact be mutually dependent on one another. 
24
The effect of civic leadership training on citizen engagement and government 
responsiveness: experimental evidence from the PhilippinesRESEARCH REPORT
Appendix 1. Characteristics of parent 
leaders in study sample
Table A1. Profile of parent leaders 
Gender Number %
Female 670 95.31
Male 33 4.69
First year of tenure Number %
2008 8 1.14
2009 28 3.98
2010 32 4.55
2011 79 11.24
2012 187 26.60
2013 89 12.66
2014 71 10.10
2015 56 7.97
2016 85 12.09
2017 68 9.67
Place of birth Number %
This barangay 307 43.67
Another barangay in this municipality 97 13.80
Another municipality 114 16.22
Another province 184 26.17
Outside the Philippines 1 0.14
Highest level of education completed Number27 %
Some elementary school 19 2.71
Completed elementary school 35 4.99
Some high school 97 13.82
Completed high school 300 42.74
Completed senior school (Grade 12) 1 0.14
Some university 132 18.80
Completed university degree 75 10.68
Technical or trade school 32 4.56
Some higher-level professional degree/graduate level 8 1.14
Completed higher-level professional degree/graduate level 3 0.43
27 One respondent answered ‘Other: Alternative Learning System’. That answer is about the type of education, not level, so her 
response was excluded from this table.
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Ethnicity Number %
Member of an indigenous peoples’ community 111 15.79
Non indigenous peoples’ community 592 84.21
Age (years)
Mean 42.69
Range 23–67
Table A2. Parent leaders’ employment in local governance
Have you ever held an elected or staff position in the barangay 
government? Number %
Yes – currently hold a position 20 2.84
Yes – have held a position in the past 49 6.97
Yes – have held a past position and currently hold a position 98 13.94
No 536 76.24
Table A3. Positions held in barangay government
Past positions held in barangay Number
Health worker 85
Tanod 6
Secretary 6
Treasurer 6
Kagawad 5
Other(s) 43
Current positions held in barangay28 Number
Health worker 83
Tanod 5
Other (e.g. day care worker, record keeper, nutrition advisor, service point officer) 29
Table A4. Positions held in municipal government
Have you ever held a position in the municipal government? Number %
Yes – have held a past position and do not currently hold a position29 17 2.41
Yes – currently hold a position30 7 1.00
No 678 96.44
Refused to answer 1 0.14
28 A parent leader who currently holds an elected position in the barangay council (e.g. captain, treasurer, secretary, or a member of 
the kagawad) is considered an official for the purpose of this analysis, and not part of the parent leader sample.
29 Positions stated include: enumerator for census (Department of Social Welfare and Development appointee); janitor; casual 
sweeper; barangay teacher substitute (Department of Education appointee); staff for community-based monitoring system.
30 Positions stated include: catering staff; clerk; administrative aide; midwife (casual status).
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Appendix 2. Statistical analysis 
conducted
31 While the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure is more powerful than other potential methods – meaning it is more likely to result in 
Type I error – we believe it is appropriate in this case. Given its small sample size, this study should be considered more akin to a 
plausibility probe than a ‘definitive’ impact evaluation, and even suggestive evidence of effects on different types of outcomes is 
potentially important for policy-makers. 
Estimation
Each research hypothesis was tested by taking the 
difference in means of the respective index values 
between treatment and control municipalities:
where: Yi is the index value for municipality i; Di  is a 
binary indicator of the treatment status for municipality 
i; NT  is the number of treatment municipalities; and NC  
is the number of control municipalities.
Due to the small sample size (n = 16), we did not 
assess statistical significance using conventional 
standard errors that rely on distributional assumptions. 
Instead, we used a non-parametric permutation 
procedure to test a sharp null hypothesis of a constant 
zero treatment effect (Efron and Tibshirani 1993):
In addition, we applied a multiple-testing adjustment 
to address the increased risk of falsely rejecting the 
null hypotheses (introduced by testing the effect of the 
intervention on multiple outcomes). Specifically, we 
used the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure to control the 
False Discovery Rate (Anderson 2008).3127 
For the purposes of this adjustment, our four primary 
hypotheses and our 12 secondary hypotheses were 
treated as two separate ‘families’ of hypotheses, meaning 
that the adjustment was applied separately to the primary 
and secondary hypotheses. For all outcomes, we report 
both unadjusted p-values obtained from the permutation 
test, and p-values adjusted for multiple testing. 
Note that for three of the indices, the results reported 
would be considered statistically significant by a 
conventional standard (either 0.05 or 0.10) if tested 
alone. However, they drop below conventional levels 
of statistical significance when taking into account the 
penalty for multiple testing.
Graphical results
The following plots show the results from the 
permutation tests for each of the 16 indices. The 
permutation test assessed how likely it would be to 
observe the difference between treatment and control 
observed in the study (the estimated effect size) if the 
treatment had no effect on any municipality. 
• The histograms represent a distribution of 
hypothetical effect size estimates, generated from 
every possible random assignment of treatment.
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Figure A1. Permutation plot for primary hypotheses
 Citizen participation (parent leader) Perceived government responsiveness (parent leader)
 Government compliance Co-option
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• The red line represents the actual estimated effect 
size. The farther the red line is from the centre of 
the distribution, the less likely it is that the result 
occurred by chance.
According to convention, a result is considered 
statistically significant if less than 5% of hypothetical 
randomisations produce effect sizes as or more 
extreme than the actual effect size.
Figure A2. Permutation plots for secondary hypotheses
 Citizen participation (4Ps) Perceived government responsiveness (4Ps)
 Civic knowledge (parent leaders) Civic knowledge (4Ps)
 Self-efficacy (parent leaders) Self-efficacy (parent leader)
 Power differential (4Ps) Power differential (parent leaders)
 Power differential (officials) Interaction
 Collective action (parent leaders) 4Ps salience
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Appendix 3A. Indexes for primary 
hypotheses
The following tables list the variables used to create the four primary hypotheses. Variables which we expected 
(ex ante) to have low variance are indicated with an asterisk (*).
Table H1L. Variables in the citizen participation (parent leaders) index
Variable Survey question Respondent type(s) Barangay-level aggregation
attend_assembly Did you attend the last barangay 
assembly held in your barangay?
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
attend_assembly_
citizens
How many people were present 
in the last barangay assembly?
Parent leaders, CCT 
beneficiaries
Average number of people 
(other than officials) reported 
by respondents. This number is 
standardised by the barangay 
population.32 
attend_
assembly_4p
How many CCT beneficiaries 
were present in the last 
barangay assembly?
Parent leaders, CCT 
beneficiaries
Average number of CCT 
beneficiaries reported by 
respondents. This number is 
standardised by the number of 
CCT beneficiaries in the 
barangay.33
comment_
assembly
Did you personally make any 
comments or ask any questions 
during the barangay assembly?
Parent leaders A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ 
if any parent leader in the 
barangay answered ‘Yes’, and 
‘0’ otherwise.
interest_local Thinking about your local 
community, how interested are 
you in local community politics 
and local community affairs?
Parent leaders Barangay-level average of the 
five-point interest scale 
response.
32 Responses to this question are aggregated from all parent leaders and CCT beneficiaries who reported being present at the barangay 
assembly. This aggregated number is included in both versions of the index. Responses to this question are categorical, with the 
following options: 30 or fewer; 31 to 60; 61 to 100; 101-200; and more than 200. For each response, we took the mid-point of the 
category and divided by the estimated number of households in the barangay. The estimated number of households was calculated 
using barangay population figures and the national average household size (4.4) from the 2015 Census of Population. For responses 
in the top category (more than 200), we used the mid-point between 201 and the estimated number of households in that barangay, 
divided by the estimated total number of households.
33 Responses to this question were aggregated from parent leaders and CCT beneficiaries who reported being present at the barangay 
assembly. This aggregated number is included in both versions of the index. Responses to this question are categorical, with the 
following options: 20 or fewer; 21 to 50; 51-100; and more than 100. For each response, we took the mid-point of the category and 
divided it by the number of CCT beneficiaries in the barangay. For responses in the top category (more than 100), we use the 
mid-point between 101 and the number of CCT beneficiaries in the barangay.
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Table H2AL. Variables in the government responsiveness (perceived – parent leaders) index
Variable Survey question Respondent type Barangay-level aggregation
welcome_
questions_bgy
To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: Most barangay 
officials welcome questions from 
citizens
Parent leaders Barangay-level average of the 
five-point agreement scale 
response to the statement.
welcome_
complaints_bgy
To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: Most barangay 
officials are open to complaints 
from citizens
Parent leaders Barangay-level average of the 
five-point agreement scale 
response to the statement.
welcome_
questions_muni
To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: Most municipal 
officials welcome questions from 
citizens
Parent leaders Barangay-level average of the 
five-point agreement scale 
response to the statement.
welcome_
complaints_muni
To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: Most municipal 
officials are open to complaints 
from citizens
Parent leaders Barangay-level average of the 
five-point agreement scale 
response to the statement.
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Table H2B. Variables in the government responsiveness (compliance) index
Variable Survey question Respondent type(s) Barangay-level aggregation
assembly_
happened*
Was there a barangay assembly held 
this year (2017)?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ if a 
majority of respondents in a 
barangay answered ‘Yes’ or 
‘Scheduled, but yet to take place’.34
assembly_notice How many days in advance were you 
notified about the time and place of 
the barangay assembly?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
For each respondent, we construct a 
variable that takes the values 1, 0.5, 
or 0, for ‘notified seven days or 
more’, ‘notified less than seven 
days’; and ‘not notified’, 
respectively. Then we take the 
barangay-level average.
mention_budget* What topics were raised by barangay 
officials independently, not in direct 
response to citizen questions?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ if a 
majority of respondents in a 
barangay (who reported attending 
the barangay assembly) reported 
that officials mentioned the budget 
in the barangay assembly; and ‘0’ 
otherwise.
mention_future* What topics were raised by barangay 
officials independently, not in direct 
response to citizen questions?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ if a 
majority of respondents in a 
barangay who reported attending 
the barangay assembly reported 
that officials mentioned future 
projects in the barangay assembly; 
and ‘0’ otherwise.
mention_updates* What topics were raised by barangay 
officials independently, not in direct 
response to citizen questions?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ if a 
majority of respondents in a 
barangay (who reported attending 
the barangay assembly) reported 
that officials mentioned updates on 
past projects in the barangay 
assembly; and ‘0’ otherwise.
questions_
allowed*
Were citizens allowed to ask questions 
of officials during the meeting?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ if the 
majority of respondents in a 
barangay (who reported attending 
the barangay assembly) answered 
‘Yes’.
present_budget* Did barangay officials present budget 
figures in writing?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ if the 
majority of respondents in a 
barangay (who reported attending 
the barangay assembly) answered 
‘Yes’.
budget_posted (i) Have you seen, or heard about, a 
barangay budget or financial 
statement posted on a bulletin board 
at the barangay hall in your barangay?
(ii) Have you seen, or heard about, a 
barangay budget or financial 
statement posted on a bulletin board 
in other places in your barangay?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
For each respondent, we code 1, 
0.5, or 0, for barangay hall and 
other public place, one of these only, 
neither or only posted in officials’ 
office. The barangay-level average 
of this variable is used in the 
analysis.
34 For cases of ‘ties’ – barangays in which an equal number of relevant respondents did and did not answer ‘Yes’ – the barangay was 
coded in a way that mitigated against finding a treatment effect in the hypothesised direction. This rule was used for all binary 
variables coded at the barangay level based on a majority of responses..
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Table H3. Variables in the co-option index
Variable Survey question Respondent type Barangay-level aggregation
employed_bgy Have you ever been employed by 
the barangay (including both 
elected positions and staff 
positions)?
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
employed_muni Have you ever been employed by 
the municipal government 
(including both elected positions 
and staff positions)?
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
asked_party_
watcher*
Were you asked to work as a 
party watcher for a particular 
candidate for the upcoming 
2017 barangay elections?
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
accepted_party_
watcher*
If yes, did you accept to work as 
a party watcher for a particular 
candidate?
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
asked_
coordinator*
Were you asked to work as a 
coordinator for a particular 
candidate for the upcoming 
2017 barangay elections?
Parent leaders, Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
accepted_
coordinator*
If yes, did you accept to work as 
a party coordinator for a 
particular candidate?
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
asked_support_
other*
Have you been asked to support 
a candidate in any other way, 
aside from working as a party 
watcher or coordinator, during 
the upcoming October 2017 
barangay elections?
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
accepted_
support_other*
If yes, did you accept to support 
a candidate in any other way, 
aside from working as a party 
watcher or coordinator, during 
the upcoming October 2017 
barangay elections?
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
assistance_
income
Did you have assistance from the 
barangay or municipal officials 
to start these activities? 
[Referring to income generating 
activities]
Parent leaders Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
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Appendix 3B. Indexes for secondary 
hypotheses
Table H1M. Variables in the citizen participation (CCT beneficiaries) index
Variable Survey question Respondent 
type(s)
Barangay-level aggregation
attend_
assembly
Did you attend the last assembly held in 
your barangay?
CCT 
beneficiaries
Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
attend_
assembly_
citizens
How many people were present in the last 
barangay assembly?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
Average number of people 
(other than officials) reported 
by respondents. This number 
was standardised by the 
barangay population.35 
attend_
assembly_4p
How many CCT beneficiaries were present 
in the last barangay assembly?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
Average number of CCT 
beneficiaries reported by 
respondents. This number was 
standardised by the number of 
CCT beneficiaries in the 
barangay.36
comment_
assembly
Did you personally make any comments 
or ask any questions during the barangay 
assembly?
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ 
if any parent leader in the 
barangay answered ‘Yes’; and 
‘0’ otherwise.
interest_local Thinking about your local community, 
how interested are you in local community 
politics and local community affairs?
CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average of the 
five-point interest scale 
response.
35 See footnote 32.
36 See footnote 33.
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Table H2AM. Variables in the government responsiveness (perceived – CCT beneficiaries) index
Variable Survey question Respondent 
type
Barangay-level aggregation
welcome_
questions_bgy
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: Most 
barangay officials welcome questions 
from citizens
CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average of the 
five-point agreement scale 
response to the statement.
welcome_
complaints_
bgy
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: Most 
barangay officials are open to complaints 
from citizens
CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average of the 
five-point agreement scale 
response to the statement.
welcome_
questions_
muni
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: Most 
municipal officials welcome questions 
from citizens
CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average of the 
five-point agreement scale 
response to the statement.
welcome_
complaints_
muni
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: Most 
municipal officials are open to complaints 
from citizens
CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average of the 
five-point agreement scale 
response to the statement.
Table H4. Variables in the civic knowledge index
Variable Survey question Respondent 
type(s)
Barangay-level aggregation
heard_bdc Have you heard of a barangay 
development council (BDC)?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
Percentage of parent leaders in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Yes’.
ask_ira To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the statement: Ordinary citizens have 
the right to ask barangay officials how 
much the Internal Revenue Allotment 
(IRA) of the barangay was last year, and 
to be provided with this information”
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
Percentage of respondents in 
the barangay who answered 
‘Strongly agree’ or ‘Agree’.
Table H5. Variables in the self-efficacy index
Variable Survey question Respondent 
type(s)
Barangay-level aggregation
welcome_
questions_bgy
How much influence do you think 
someone like you can have over barangay 
government decisions?
Parent 
leaders / CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average of 
four-point scale response, 
which takes the values:  
4 = a lot; 3 = some;  
2 = a little; 1 = not at all.
welcome_
complaints_
bgy
How much influence do you think 
someone like you can have over national 
government decisions?
Parent 
leaders / CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average of 
four-point scale response, 
which takes the values:  
4 = a lot; 3 = some;  
2 = a little; 1 = not at all.
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Table H6. Variables in the power differential index
Variable Survey question Respondent 
type(s)
Barangay-level aggregation
afraid_
officials
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the statement: Most people are at 
least a little afraid of barangay officials
Parent 
leaders / CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average five-point 
agreement scale response to the 
statement, with strong agreement 
coded as ‘1’ and strong disagreement 
is coded as ‘5’.
fear_
retaliation
How much do you personally fear 
retaliation if you report a complaint about 
a government official? 
Parent 
leaders / CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average. This can 
take the following values: a lot / 
some / a little / not at all”, coded as 
1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
able_
criticise
In your opinion, are people nowadays 
able to criticise the government without 
fear? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 
7, with 7 being the most fear
Parent 
leaders / CCT 
beneficiaries
Barangay-level average of seven-
point scale response to the 
statement, re-coded so that ‘1’ is the 
most fear and ‘7’ is the least fear.
opinions_
matter_
officials
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the statement: Citizens’ opinions 
matter just as much as the opinions of 
barangay officials
Parent 
leaders / CCT 
beneficiaries / 
Officials
Barangay-level average of five-point 
agreement scale response to the 
statement.
equal_
value
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the statement: Citizens and 
barangay officials are essentially equal in 
their value to the community
Parent 
leaders / CCT 
beneficiaries / 
Officials
Barangay-level average of five-point 
agreement scale response to the 
statement.
opinions_
matter_
citizens
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the statement: My opinion matters 
just as much as that of a barangay official
Parent 
leaders / CCT 
beneficiaries 
Barangay-level average of five-point 
agreement scale response to the 
statement.
Table H7. Variables in the interaction index
Variable Survey question Respondent 
type
Barangay-level aggregation
talked_bgy_
officials
Since becoming a PL, have you talked with 
barangay officials that you never talked to 
before you became a PL?
Parent 
leaders 
Percentage of respondents in a 
barangay who answered ‘Yes’.
talked_muni_
officials
Since becoming a PL, have you talked with 
municipal officials that you never talked to 
before you became a PL?
Parent 
leaders 
Percentage of respondents in a 
barangay who answered ‘Yes’.
spoken_
captain
Over the past six months, how often have you 
spoken with the barangay captain in person?
Parent 
leaders 
Barangay-level mean of 
frequency option responses.37
spoken_
kagawad
Over the past six months, how often have you 
spoken with a barangay kagawad in person?
Parent 
leaders 
Barangay-level mean of 
frequency option responses.
spoken_
sectreas
Over the past six months, how often have you 
spoken with a barangay treasurer or secretary 
in person?
Parent 
leaders 
Barangay-level mean of 
frequency option responses.
37 Frequencies for this set of questions were coded as follows: 180 for ‘Every day or almost every day’; 72 for ‘Not every day, but several 
times per week’; 24 for ‘About once a week’; 18 for ‘Not every week, but several times per month’; 6 for ‘About once a month’; 5 for ‘Not 
every month, but more than three times over the last six months’; 3 for ‘Only 2-3 times over the last six months’; 1 for ‘Only once over 
the last six months’; and 0 for ‘Never’.
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spoken_
mayor
Over the past six months, how often have you 
spoken (in person) with someone from the 
mayor’s office, including the mayor?
Parent 
leaders 
Barangay-level mean of 
frequency option responses.
spoken_mc Over the past six months, how often have you 
spoken with any member (or members) of the 
municipal council in person?
Parent 
leaders 
Barangay-level mean of 
frequency option responses.
Table H8. Variables in the collective work index
Variable Survey question Respondent 
type
Barangay-level Aggregation
collective_
activities
In the past six months, which of the 
following has been organised in your 
barangay? Please select all that apply.
Parent leaders Barangay-level average.38 
collective_
participation
People do not always have time to 
participate in community activities, even if 
they want to help out. Did you personally 
participate?
CCT 
beneficiaries 
Percentage of respondents in a 
barangay who answered ‘Yes’ 
to any activity.39
Table H9. Variables in the salience index
Variable Survey question Respondent 
type(s)
Barangay-level aggregation
mention_pl During the meeting, did barangay 
officials mention the 4Ps parent 
leaders for any reason?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable, coded as ‘1’ if 
the majority of parent leaders and 
CCT respondents in a barangay 
(who reported attending the 
barangay assembly) answered 
‘Yes’.
mention_4ps During the meeting, did barangay 
officials mention the 4Ps beneficiaries 
for any reason?
Parent leaders, 
CCT 
beneficiaries
A binary variable coded as ‘1’ if the 
majority of PL and CCT 
respondents in a barangay who 
reported attending the barangay 
assembly answered ‘Yes’.
collective_4Ps Were 4Ps members specifically asked 
or required to participate?
Parent leaders For each event or activity 
mentioned, we coded the response 
as ‘1’ if the respondent answered 
‘Yes, asked but not required’ or 
‘Yes, required’; and ‘0’ if the 
respondent answered ‘No’. We took 
the mean for each respondent 
(across all activities mentioned), 
and the average of respondent-
level means for each barangay.
38 Because parent leaders are often asked to mobilise beneficiaries to participate in community activities, they will have greater awareness 
regarding the total number of activities that were organised and are likely to provide more accurate responses to this question.
39 Only CCT beneficiary responses to this question were used. Because parent leaders are typically tasked with mobilising beneficiaries to 
participate in events, they are very likely to participate personally in any events that are organised. Here, we intend to capture variation 
in participation, conditional on events being organised.
Table H7. Continued
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